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This paper compares the operative performances of the banking institutions in China and 
India, taking into account the contentious issue of institutional differences in banking 
sectors in these two economies, reflected in the generation of non-performing loans. The 
study also examines the issue of the use of banks to provide countervailable subsidies to 
exporting organizations. Our results show that the efficiency differences between banks in 
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Rapid economic growth of India and China and their significant contribution to 
international economy, has made comparative analyses of these two countries quite 
common these days (Farrell, Khanna, Sinha, Woetzel 2004; Ernst and Young, 2006; 
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Bussièrre and Mehl, 2008; Bosworth and Collins 2007, Roland 2007; Aziz, 2008). Using 
a growth accounting framework, Bosworth and Collins (2007) compared economic 
performances of India and China by examining contribution of inputs and productivity 
growth for the aggregate economies as well as for agriculture, industry and services over 
the period 1978-2004. Aziz (2008) using growth model compared the real and financial 
sector linkages in China and India and concluded that for evaluating China’s and India’s 
economic performance, an understanding of financial institutions is crucial. Similarly, 
Gamble (2005) tried to compare China’s Construction Bank and India’s ICICI Bank 
(formerly Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India). However, all these 
studies ignore the institutional differences between these two countries and tend to 
compare these two countries as if they are similar in all respects concerning their 
institutional and regulatory set up and their developments.  
Banking institutions are critical financial intermediaries for economic growth. At times, 
and especially in developing economies, banks are also prone to legal and political 
interventions leading to distortion in international economy. Access to finance is the most 
critical component of any firm’s operations and a lopsided access has a potential to distort 
the level playing field of industries operating in international business (Helleiner, 1992). 
The Basel I Accord (the Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measures 
and Capital Standards) requiring reserve capital of at least eight percent or more of the 
risk-weighted assets of a bank followed by Basel II (the New Basel Capital Accord) 
requiring internal ratings-based (IRB) capital (Claessens, Underhill and Zhang, 2008; 
Jokivuolle and Vesala, 2007) are the two international attempts to introduce such level 
playing field (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006; Chakraborty and Linda, 
2007).  
While the Indian banks are mainly profit oriented, the Chinese banks are operationally 
closely related to the Chinese government’s budgeting operation (Bonin and Huang, 
2001; Chiu and Lewis, 2006). Thus the banking practices in these two countries are quite 
different. While the Chinese commercial banks have mainly extended loans to the 
Chinese State owned enterprises (SOEs) (Lardy, 1999), the Indian banks are more 
commercial in nature although there are governmental stipulations for priority sector 
advances. Similarly, the way the non-performing loans (NPLs) have been dealt with in 
these two countries are also quite different due to the differences in governmental, 
economical and legal institutional set ups existing in thee two countries.    3
Banking institutions can also act as significant facilitators of exports and thus banking 
practices occupy a very important place in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (ASCD) because of their sensitivity in providing direct financial 
subsidies. In every action taken by or against Members of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) such as the USA, the EU, Japan, India etc. involving countervailing duties, 
benefits provided by banks through favourable loans have been the most contentious issue 
(WTO 2005, 2007). In recent years, the most important example of banks providing 
subsidies is in the case of Dynamic Random Access Memories (DRAMS) manufactured 
by Hynix from Korea where the USA, the EU and Japan all imposed countervailing 
duties on imports of DRAMS from Korea exclusively on the basis of Korean banks 
alleged favourable treatment to Hynix through loan wavers, loan postponement or even 
changes in the interest rates of such loans. Korea took each and every decision of these 
governments before the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (WTO 2005, 2007). 
Although NPLs connote a financial asset of a bank, assets which have stopped earning 
expected returns, they also reflect adversely on the productivity of the banks, the 
corresponding industry and the nation harbouring such assets. Viewed from this 
perspective, the NPLs are the products of the social, economic, financial and legal 
institutions of a country. The NPLs are generated because of infirmities in the debt 
recovery process, inadequate legal provisions for bankruptcy, judicial limitations in 
getting court orders and in the execution of court decrees (Bhide, Prasad and Ghosh, 
2001). A precise quantification of NPLs is difficult because of the tendency of banks to 
hide their weaknesses (Chipalkani and Rishi, 2007).
1  One of the reasons for this 
confusion is the non-uniformity in the classification and the consequent definition of 
NPLs. According to the International Monetary Fund, “A loan is nonperforming when 
payments of interest and principal are past due by 90 days or more, or at least 90 days of 
interest payments have been capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement, or 
payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good reasons – such as a 
debtor filing for bankruptcy - to doubt that payments will be made in full.”
2  However, 
those loans which are not returned or are allowed to be recycled provide the banks not 
only with extra assets on their balance sheet but also with extra profits on their profit and 
                                                 
1 Chu’s (2008) report on China’s financial system put the total amount of troubled debt at roughly US$700 
billion which is more than four times the official figure of US$ 164 billion. Fitch’s figures include ‘special 
mention’ loans and other problem loans which are not officially classified as “nonperforming.”  
2 In Bloem and Freeman (2005), p. 2   4
loss account (Xu 2005; Chiu and Lewis 2006; Aziz 2008). Such non-returned loans can 
also help firms, having such access to fund, an extra advantage particularly in the 
international market where they can act as direct export subsidies (Dwight 2004; Aziz 
2008).
3 Scholars even discussed subsidy provided to the bank deposit insurance in the 
case of the Chinese banking as having moral hazard effects (Ketcha, 1999). 
In this article, we have examined the operative performances of the banks in China and 
India taking into accounts the generation and disposals of their NPLs to reflect the 
institutional differences in these two economies. Using a non-parametric technique, the 
efficiencies of the banks have been assessed from 2002 to 2005, which was the period 
when the banks were undergoing major reorganizations in both countries. So far, most of 
the studies comparing India and China (Farrell et al 2004, 2006; Saez, 2004; Bosworth 
and Collins, 2007; Roland, 2007; Tseng & Cowen, 2007; Bussièrre and Mehl, 2008), did 
not take into account the related institutional developments in these two countries. This 
study contributes to the literature by comparing efficiencies of the banking sector of India 
and China taking into account the institutional aspects of their development. This study is 
expected to lead to a significant insight not only into the comparative efficiencies of the 
banks, but also into other factors affecting vital financial intermediation. Results suggest 
that Chinese restructured banks recorded continuing decline in their efficiencies over the 
study period. Two Indian banks, State Bank of India and ICICI have shown consistent 
performance as the most efficient banks.  
The remainder of the article is arranged as follows. The section 2 provides an overview of 
the NPLs and restructuring processes in Indian and Chinese banking sectors. Section 3 
discusses the analytical models used for efficiency estimates of the banks and the data 
used for the study. Section 4 discusses the empirical evidence on efficiency of the banks, 
with special reference to their NPL adjusted operative performances. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Overview of Banks and their NPLs in China and India 
                                                 
3 It is not possible to quantify NPLs in the circumstances such as those prevailing in China and India. 
Particularly in the case of China, the nonperforming loans data were not released for quite a long time and 
are not available consistently (Bonin and Huang, 2001). First official report of NPLs in China was issued 
only in 2003 by People’s Bank of China.  
   5
2.1 NPLs in Chinese Banks and Infusion of funds by the Chinese Government
4 
China has four major banks, of which three have become public limited banks with the 
issue of shares. These three are Industrial and Commercial Banks of China (ICBC), China 
Construction Bank Corporation (CCBC), and Bank of China (BOC), whereas Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) still stays at its old format. A number of foreign banks entered into 
the Chinese recapitalization process through the purchase of privately placed shares. 
Other Chinese government owned banks such as China Communications Bank, China 
Merchant Bank (CMB) and China Citic Bank (CCB) have also raised funds from the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Stock Markets in recent times. Apart from these banks, China 
has 12 Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCB), more than 100 city commercial banks, a 
number of rural cooperative banks, rural commercial banks, and foreign banks. China 
also has three policy banks and a large number of urban and rural credit cooperatives 
(Okazaki, 2007).  
China’s six major banks have raised more than US$ 50 billion through international 
public offerings since mid-2005 (Reuters, 2007). The Chinese loans have grown at a 
compound annual growth rate of 15.6 per cent and the deposit at the rate of 18.1 percent 
in the last five years (CITIC, 2007). In China, banks and the stock markets provide 
limited finance at present and the percentage of self-raised funds comprises a very 
significant proportion of the investment. Despite this, the banking practices in China may 
have provided Chinese industries and Chinese banks with unusual advantages (Allen et al 
2007, Aziz, 2008).  
In its attempt to modernize its financial institutions, the Chinese government started the 
process of restructuring of its banks. Table 1 outlines a list of these policies. The process 
of restructuring started with the issue of RMB 270 billion in Special Government Bonds 
in August 1998 (Table 1). The banks could buy the bonds after the Chinese government 
reduced statutory reserve requirement from 13 to 8 percent (Xie, 1999). The government 
then injected all the bond proceeds in their four major banks thereby virtually doubling 
their capital base. These bonds have left scholars perplexed as till now there is no sign of 
payment of any interest on these bonds. This was followed in 1999 by the establishment 
of the four Asset Management Companies (AMCs) to which NPLs worth RMB 1.4 
                                                 
4 Figures pertaining to China have been given in RMB with 8 RMB= 1 US dollar. Figures pertaining to 
India have been given in Rupees with 40 Rupees = 1 US dollar. (Rupees One crore = 10 million).   6
trillion (US$173 billion) or 20 percent of the total loan balance at that time were 
transferred at par value (Ma, 2006). These NPL transfers in 1999 were claimed to be 
restricted to those loans incurred before the end of 1995 (Ma and Fung, 2002). To 
complete this transaction, AMCs issued bonds to the four banks. Although the rate of 
interest is mentioned in the corresponding documents, but so far, it appears that no 
interest has been paid at all. Moreover, the 20 percent cash recovery rate claimed by the 
AMCs would not be able to cover the interest payment on these bonds and PBC loans 
assumed by the AMCs (Ma, 2006, p. 23; Li 2008).   
 
TABLE 1: POLICY SCHEDULE FOR CHINESE BANKS 
 
1998 
RMB 270 billion (US$33 billion at 1998 exchange rates) injected in equity 
capital in 1998. This equity was raised by the government by selling bonds to 
the banks and payment for such buying came when the Chinese government 
lowered the capital adequacy ratio to 8 percent from 13 percent. 
1999 
RMB 1400 billion (us$ 169 billion at 1999 exchange rates) were transferred to 
AMCs. This constituted roughly 20 percent of the total loans at that time. 
AMCs also assumed the banks’ liabilities to the People’s Bank of China. Early 
recovery rates on the bad loans were 30 percent which later fell to 15 to 20 
percent.   
2003 
US$ 45 billion of the People’s Bank of China were endorsed to China 
Construction Bank and the Bank of China to increase their formal capital in 
2003. 
2004 
The PBOC bought RMB 320 billion (US$ 39 billion) of NPLs from China 
Construction Bank and Bank of China at half their book value. The Chinese 
Ministry of Finance wrote off RMB 320 billon of its equity stake in these two 
banks.  
2005 
US$ 15 billion in foreign currency was transferred to ICBC as capital through 
Huijin (April 2005). The Chinese Finance Ministry wrote down RMB 170 billion 
(US$ 20 billion) amounting to one third of its existing equity in ICBC and 
injected another RMB 124 billion (US$ 30 billion) in new capital. The PBOC 
also bought RMB 460 billion (US$ 56 billion) in NPLs at par. In addition, RMB 
246 billion (US$ 30 billion) were put in a joint MOF/ICBC special purpose 
receivable account. The aggregate allowance for impairment loss of RMB 567 




China Everbright Bank received RMB 20 billion (US$ 2.7 billion) capital 
injection in 2007 from Huijin which has become a subsidiary of the China 
Investment Corporation (Martin, 2008) 
2008  Central Huijin again injected RMB 130 billion in Agricultural Bank of China in 
2008 (Yuzhe and Xiu, 2008). 
 
Source: Ma (2006); Setser (2007), Martin (2008), Prospectuses and annual reports of ICBC, 
CCBC and BOC. 
 
The transfer to the AMCs was followed by the endorsement of US$ 60 billion of Chinese 
government’s reserve invested in the USA to China CCBC (US$22.5 billion), BOC (US$ 
22.5 billion) and to ICBC (US$ 15 billion). In 2004, another RMB 780 billion (US$ 96 
billion) worth NPLs were transferred by CCB, BOC and ICBC to AMCs through a   7
number of transactions involving the People’s Bank of China (PBC). First RMB 320 
billion in NPAs was bought by PBC from CCBC and BOC at half of their book value and 
then transferred to the AMCs for 30-40 cents to a dollar (Table 1). In 2005, PBC bought 
another RMB 460 billion from ICBC at par value and then transferred to the AMCs for an 
average of 26 cents for a dollar. The PBC has apparently made a loss of RMB 400 billion 
(US$ 50 billion) or as Ma (2006) puts it, some 20 times more than its own capital.  
There appears to be certain discrepancies regarding the quantity of NPLs in Chinese 
banks. As per the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC, 2008), the percentage 
of NPLs in Chinese banks is around 6.17 per cent. Ernst and Young’s study on May 2, 
2006 claimed that the NPL percentage in the contemporary Chinese loans would be more 
than 32 percent of total loans (Ernst and Young, 2006). Pei and Shirai (2004) have done 
their own calculations. Other scholars such as Setser (2006) have also provided estimates 
ranging from 37 percent in 2002 to 24 percent in 2005, provided there is no fresh addition 
to NPLs.  
According to Ma (2006), the cost of restructuring of the Chinese banks assuming that 
there are no further problems with these banks would come to staggering 30 percent of 
the China’s GDP. While discussing bailout policy of Chinese banks, Mundaca and 
Quifeng (2005) critically observed that “What is then at risk is the insolvency of virtually 
the entire banking system. Risk, return, effort and capital adequacy have meant nothing 
for Chinese banking industry.” (Mundaca and Quifeng, 2005, p. 2).  
2.2 NPLs in India and Infusion of Funds by the Indian Government 
The Indian banking industry comprises nationalised banks, old private banks, new private 
banks and foreign banks (Banerjee et al, 2005). The importance of public sector banks 
has been coming down in recent years but they still command major share of banking 
activities. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is the central bank responsible for the control 
and operations of others banks, including managing the money supply. The Bank 
Nationalisation Act of 1980 named as the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer 
of Undertaking) Act, 1980, stipulates that the Indian government’s equity in nationalized 
banks cannot fall below 51 percent. This act also restricted the holding of foreign 
financial institutions at 24 percent in Indian banks. This governmental control apparently 
brought the banks under constant vigilance scrutiny and led to a high degree of 
underlending (Chakrabarti, 2005).    8
The percentage of bank loans to GDP in India is less than 50 percent and suggests low 
credit penetration (Nitsure, 2007). The credit deposit ratio is hovering around 50 percent 
whereas it should have been around 70 percent (Naik, 2002). The underlending is also 
evidenced by the Indian banks’ investment in government securities, which was more 
than Rs. 1,000 billion (or approximately US Dollar 25 billion) in the year 2000 (Naik, 
2002). Loans of the Indian banking sector have grown seven times between 1995 and 
2007 (from Rs. 5984 billion to Rs. 45,372 billion). Unsecured consumer loans, capital 
market exposure and real estate lending comprise less than 10 percent of total loans 
(Nitsure, 2007). Banks in India are required to lend at least 40 percent of their loans to the 
designated priority sector such as agriculture and small scale industries (SSI) at an 
interest rate no more than 4 percentage points above their prime lending rates.  
Amounts of NPLs seem to be also understated in India (Topalova, 2004). The Tarapore 
Committee report suggests an acceptable figure of around 13.7 percent in 1997 which was 
recommended to be brought down to 5 percent by the year 2000. The Narasimhan 
Committee (RBI, 1998) suggested transfer of NPAs to Asset Reconstruction Company 
(ARCs) on the realizable value of NPLs and issue of “NPA Swap Bonds” (Bhaumik and 
Piess, 2004). The government was supposed to guarantee these bonds issued by the ARCs. 
Another committee was formed to suggest how to improve weak public sector banks 
called Verma Committee which prepared guidelines for restructuring of ARCs (RBI, 
1999). Unlike China, Indian NPLs have not been generated through extending loans to 
state-owned enterprises (Muniappan, 2002; RBI, 2007).
5 The involvement in share 
market speculation by Indian banks also led to the generation of NPLs. The disposal of 
these NPLs also took an entirely different route. 
The Indian government has always been supportive of banks possibly to enhance the 
depositors’ confidence in banks and has been injecting funds to support the system. These 
infusions are mostly merger of failed banks with larger banks although there have been 
certain liquidations since 1969. Banerjee et al (2005) identified 21 cases of such bank 
failure.  In recent years, India has established one ARC (India) Limited (ARCIL) to deal 
with NPLs of Indian banks. In addition, the RBI has granted registration to six more 
ARCs (PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2008). This was facilitated by the enactment of the 
                                                 
5 According to Muniappan (2002) until March 2001,  the NPLs attributed to the Indian state owned 
enterprises was less than 2.5per cent of total NPLs, whereas RBI (2007) calculated this ratio to be less than 
1.3 percent in 2006.   9
Securitisation and Reconstruction of financial Assets and Enforcement of Security 
Interest (SARFAESI) Act (Chakrabarti, 2005). The Indian banks are, also, approaching 
the market directly with their NPL portfolios without going through ARCs 
(PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2008). The NPLs are transferred to ARCs for disposal purposes 
and banks receive only security receipts (pass-through instruments) from ARCs till the 
disposal of their NPLs.  
TABLE 2: POLICY SCHEDULE FOR INDIAN BANKS 
 
1993  Rs. 64000 million infused in 1993-94 to attain capital adequacy ration of 8 
percent by 31 March 1996 
1995  Rs. 43620 million infused in 1994-95 to attain capital adequacy ratio 
US$ 150 million borrowed from the World Bank infused in six public sector 
banks by way of subordinated debts.   1998  Rs. 21000 million infused in United Bank of India (UBI), Union Bank of India 
(UOI) and Indian Bank in 1997-98 
1999  Rs. 4000 million infused in 1998-99 in these banks. 
2004  Total of Rs. 204460 million infused by 1999 on recapitalisation of the 
nationalised banks which increased to Rs. 225160 million by 2004. 
Source: Various annual reports of RBI. 
To improve the performance of public sector banks, the Indian government wanted to go 
for gradual privatization of these banks which needed improvement in the balance sheet 
of these banks, primarily through capital infusion. The Indian government had already 
provided Rs. 40 billion for recapitalization of 19 nationalized banks from 1991-92 to 
1992-93. The capital injection was made through the issue of bonds directly to 
recapitalized banks, with fixed coupon rates of 7.7per cent and 10 per cent per annum, in 
subsequent issues.  Certain performance obligations were introduced on these banks 
including deposit mobilization, improvement of investment yield, expansion and 
diversification of credit, reduction of NPLs, cost reduction, voluntary retirement etc. Over 
the period 1993-2004, the Indian government infused around Rs. 225.16 billion for 
strengthening the capital base of nationalised banks (RBI, 2007). It is worth noting that, 
out of the total infused fund of Rs. 225.16 billion, a high proportion (Rs. 221.16 billion) 
was infused over 1993-1998. Table 2 describes the schedule of most of these funds 
infused within the period. As a part of the recapitalisation, the Indian government is also 
investing Rs. 100 billion (US$2.5 billion) in SBI keeping its 59.73 percent of original 
stake (David, 2007). SBI has also raised about Rs. 160 billion (US$ 4 billion) from 
investors by March 2008. Some of the Indian banks have returned capital to the 
government to the total amount of Rs.13.03 billion by March 2004 although most of these 
banks are still paying interest on their recapitalised fund (RBI, 2007).    10
3. Methodology 
The preceding discussions clearly show the differences in characteristics and patterns in 
Indian and Chinese banking sectors, despite similarities in terms of high growth of banks 
in these two economies. It would be of interest to evaluate the banks operative 
performance taking into consideration the institutional differences reflected by the 
generation of NPLs. This needs an analytical framework to compare the operative 
efficiencies of these banks. 
Although at the individual country level, there has been a plethora of studies relating to 
efficiency measurement of banks in China and India (Berger et al., 2008; Fu and 
Heffernan, 2007; Chen et al., 2005; Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003;   
Sathye, 2003), only a limited number of comparative studies is available such as Saez 
(2004) and Roland (2007). For estimating efficiencies of firms or decision making units 
(DMUs), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been a popular non-parametric methods 
used in recent literature. DEA is specially suited for multi product processes such as the 
ones seen in service sector firms including banks.  
3.1 DEA: Theoretical Underpinnings 
Farrell (1957) proposed that the productive efficiency of any firm consists of two 
components, technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency. Using an input (output) 
oriented framework, Farrell (1957) defined TE as the ability of the firm to minimise 
(maximise) inputs (outputs) with a given set of outputs (inputs). Farrell (1957) explained 
allocative efficiency as the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given 
their respective prices and production technology (Coelli et al, 2005).  
Drawing on Farrell’s (1957) proposition, Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) first 
suggested DEA methodology to empirically estimate frontier over data points, assuming 
constant returns to scale (CRS) technology. A more generalised methodology was 
proposed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984), assuming variable returns to scale 
(VRS) technology, allowing decomposition of TE into pure technical efficiency (PTE) 
and scale efficiency (SE). The DEA models with the assumption of CRS are restrictive in 
the sense that such models are only appropriate when all DMUs are operating at an 
optimal scale, which could be unlikely for Chinese and Indian banks (Chen et al, 2005). 
The study does not examine allocative efficiency due to difficulties associated with   11
obtaining comparable input costs in Chinese and Indian banks However, the study 
provides useful insights into the banks’ operative performance given the wide 
implications of technical efficiencies in terms of technical knowledge and skills and since 
TE changes serve as a key source of productivity growth.   
The following paragraphs briefly explore the standard linear programming involved in 
DEA methodology. Let there be N firms and let xi represents the input matrix of the ith 
firm and yi represents the output matrix of the same firm. Let X represents K x N input 
matrix and Y represent M x N output matrix for all firms.  
Using input orientated approach, the relative efficiency of each bank is specified as  
0 ,
1 ' / '
. .
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where   is the vector of output produced by the ith bank, and   is the vector of inputs 
used by the ith bank, u and v are M x 1 and K x 1 vectors of output and input weights (the 
prime denotes a transposed vector). The first condition ensures that efficiency scores for 
all banks cannot score more than one and the second condition ensures that weights are 
non-negative. The above mathematical problem (1) requires estimation of the values for u 
and v ensuring that when applied to every producer’s inputs and outputs, the weighted 
output-to-input ratio would be maximised for the producer being evaluated and no firm in 
the sample has a ratio of more than unity.  
i y i x
The DEA searches for the ratio of all weighted outputs over all weighted inputs. The 
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Where λ is an N x 1 vector of constants, θ is a scalar and denotes efficiency score for the 
ith firm such that  1 ≤ θ , with a value of one indicating that the DMU lies on the frontier 
and hence, is technically efficient.  
Following Banker et al (1984),  the linear programming problem given by (2) above is 
modified to account for VRS, by adding convexity constraints N1’λ = 1, where N1 is an 
N x 1 vector of ones. The next step is to solve the following linear program which 























The convexity constraint given by N1’λ = 1, implies that an inefficient bank would be 
compared or benchmarked against banks of similar size.  
3.2 Data  
The data used in this study have been mainly obtained from databases such as Bankscope 
and Osiris, and from Annual Reports of various banks, the RBI, and from prospectuses of 
Chinese banks used for raising funds on Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Our sample 
consists of 13 Chinese banks and 19 Indian banks.
6 These banks comprise nearly 80 per 
cent of the banking operation in both the countries. 
Adopting an intermediation approach, we assumed banks as multi output DMUs 
producing total loans and non-interest income; with inputs such as total deposits and non-
interest expenses. To incorporate the role of the NPLs in the efficiency calculations, we 
have used the pooled data with loans as one of the outputs reduced by certain percentages 
to reflect the presence of the NPLs. NPLs are essentially total loss for the bank except for  
the recovery of certain percentages by banks and the AMCs. The data of percentage 
recovery from the disposal of the NPLs in China is not clear as it also involves a large 
                                                 
6 We have not used policy banks in our sample.    13
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE DATA  
   Variables Variables 
   Y1 Y2 X1 X2 Y1 Y2 X1 X2 
   2005 2004 
Mean  736994.5 8952.8  1033011.5  18703.9  614858.1 6833.1  907301.3  15643.3 
St. Dev.  1074847.9 16566.8  1631400.0 29093.5  926290.3 11675.6  1433514.4 24215.0 
Max.  4364515.0 66580.3  5736866.0  133739.7  3232585.3 53425.6  5176282.0  116060.7 
Combined 
Min.  107.6 37.2  26659.0  0.7  100.9 41.7  23440.0  3.6 
Mean  890778.7 7861.3  1540740.3  18260.8  828091.6 6452.9  1382439.2  15755.6 
St. Dev.  1226316.9 12631.4  2147591.2 27045.4  1163825.9 10155.5  1890200.9 23048.2 
Max.  3205861.0 44171.3  5736866.0 81585.0  3109191.0 35441.1  5176282.0 62639.0 
Chinese 
Min.  107.6 37.2  26659.0  0.7  100.9 41.7  23440.0  3.6 
Mean  631773.8 9699.6  685618.0  19007.0  468961.5 7093.2  582206.9  15566.5 
St. Dev.  978950.8 19101.4  1093299.3 31142.8  720686.9 12877.9  939464.6 25606.5 
Max.  4364515.0 66580.3  5061052.9  133739.7  3232585.3 53425.6  4354333.4  116060.7 
Indian 
Min.  22822.3 196.3  27492.3 699.8  18846.4 136.3  24715.3 601.3 
   2003 2002 
Mean  524999.9 4886.5  734487.5  13638.7  370300.0 4211.4  606623.8 8672.1 
St. Dev.  809231.3 8692.9  1222743.1  21840.9  596189.7 8000.6  1014354.8  16063.6 
Max.  2766055.0 44736.9  4706861.0  100053.6  2252529.8 41720.5  4100517.0 91767.3 
Combined 
Min.  92.0 33.5  20814.0  5.8 68.9 24.9  14245.0  0.7 
Mean  729855.7 3961.3  1075947.5  14405.1  450152.1 2959.1  848073.3 4575.7 
St. Dev.  1039396.8 5620.9  1603146.1  22773.4  721356.5 4806.5  1296107.6 6226.7 
Max.  2766055.0 18237.7  4706861.0 62777.0  1912960.0 16991.6  4100517.0 20266.0 
Chinese 
Min.  92.0 33.5  20814.0  5.8 68.9 24.9  14245.0  0.7 
Mean  384835.4 5519.5  500856.9  13114.4  315664.5 5068.2  441421.5  11474.8 
St. Dev.  597101.1  10394.1 848344.2  21796.2 507435.6  9640.0 762351.4  19953.5 
Max.  2656918.1 44736.9  3919261.9  100053.6  2252529.8 41720.5  3514224.0 91767.3 
Indian 
Min.  14712.0 112.8  21491.0 470.8  10973.8 109.0  18232.6 454.1 
    Pooled Series      
Mean  561788.2 6220.9  820356.0  14164.5      
St. Dev.  869523.4 11737.9  1339410.5 23293.3      
Max.  4364515.0 66580.3  5736866.0  133739.7       Combined 
Min.  68.9 24.9  14245.0  0.7      
Mean  724719.5 5308.6  1211800.1  13249.3      
St. Dev.  1038346.3 8862.5  1731851.0  21348.8      
Max.  3205861.0 44171.3  5736866.0 81585.0       Chinese 
Min.  68.9 24.9  14245.0  0.7      
Mean  450308.8 6845.2  552525.8  14790.7      
St. Dev.  718422.0 13376.3  905216.9 24654.8      
Max.  4364515.0 66580.3  5061052.9  133739.7       Indian 
Min.  10973.8 109.0  18232.6 454.1      
Note: Y1=Total Loans; Y2=Non-interest Income; X1= Total deposits; X2= Non-interest 
Expenses. 
All values are in million units of national currencies. 
Source: Estimated by the authors.   14
amount of debt-equity swap. To account for NPLs in Chinese banks, total loans of these 
banks have been discounted by 20 per cent, 25 per cent and 30 per cent. For Indian Banks, 
we have used NPL of 13 percent and 3 percent for output adjustments (RBI, 2007).  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the data, in chronological order, for all banks 
combined as well as for Indian and Chinese banks, separately. The mean and standard 
deviations of all the four variables viz., total loans (Y1), non-interest income (Y2), total 
deposits (X1) and non-interest expenses (X2) increased over time, for Indian, Chinese and 
combined banks (Table 3).  As revealed by the maximum values, some of Chinese and 
Indian banks seem to have higher deposits and non-interest expenses, respectively. In 
contrast, the minimum figures indicate very low amount of total loans and non-interest 
income for some Chinese banks. These characteristics have been further summarised for 
the pooled series provided at the bottom of the table.     
4. Empirical Evidence  
4.1Result Analysis 
Table 4 reports the NPL adjusted and unadjusted scores of PTE of the Chinese and Indian 
banks. It is important to see how the TE changes over time as well as whether banks’ 
efficiencies have been affected by the discounting of their loans to reflect their NPLs. 
Because of the brevity of space, we have reported two out of six combinations of 
discounted ratios, viz., 30 percent for Chinese banks with 3 and 13 per cent for Indian 
banks.  
Three Chinese banks (ABC, CCG and DCCB) and two Indian banks (ICIC and SBI) 
appear to be on operating on the frontier being fully efficient over period of the study 
(Table 4). The most surprising result has come from the Chinese banks where the major 
Chinese banks such as CCBC, ICBC and BOC which have undergone extensive 
restructurings along with significant infusion of funds in the last few years are showing 
increasing loss in their efficiencies (Table 4). The reduction in inefficiencies of major   15 
Table 4: NPL ADJUSTED AND NPL UNADJUSTED PURE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN CHINESE AND INDIAN BANKS, 2002-
2005 
2005 2004  2003  2002 
































Chinese Banks  
Agr. Bank of China (ABC)  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Bank of Beijing Corp. Ltd. (BBC)  0.17  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18  0.18 0.19  0.19  0.19 0.18  0.18  0.18 
Bank of China (BOC)  0.32  0.28  0.29  0.52 0.45  0.47 0.59  0.51  0.54 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Bank of Shanghai (BOS)  0.29  0.29  0.29  0.28 0.28  0.28 0.24  0.24 0.24 0.14  0.14  0.14 
China Merchandise Bank (CMB)  0.33  0.33  0.33 0.27 0.27  0.27 0.30  0.30 0.30 0.19  0.19  0.19 
China Citic Bank (CCB)  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
China Construction Bank Corp. (CCBC)  0.32  0.26 0.28 0.46 0.32  0.36 1.00  0.74  0.87 1.00  0.59  0.86 
China Minsheng Bank Corp (CMBC)  1.00  0.99 0.99 0.13 0.13  0.13 0.14  0.14  0.14 0.13  0.13  0.13 
Dongguan City Com. Bank Ltd. (DCCB)   1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Industrial & Com. Bank of China (ICBC)  0.66  0.46  0.52 1.00 0.68  0.75 1.00  0.69 0.83 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Ningbo Commercial Bank (NCB)  0.90  0.90  0.90 0.98 0.98  0.98 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Shanghai Pudong Dev. Bank (SPDB)  0.21  0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20  0.20 0.20  0.20  0.20 0.16  0.16  0.16 
Shenzhen Commercial Bank (SCB)  0.55  0.54  0.55 0.53 0.52  0.53 0.57  0.57 0.57 0.53  0.53  0.53 
Indian Banks 
Andhra Bank  0.31  0.32  0.32 0.31 0.32  0.31 0.33  0.33 0.33 0.34  0.35  0.35 
Bharat Overseas  1.00  1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 0.83  0.83  0.83 
Bank of Baroda (BOB)  0.24  0.25  0.24  0.25 0.26  0.26 0.35  0.36 0.35 0.70  0.70  0.70 
Canara Bank   0.31  0.32  0.32  0.32  0.33 0.32  0.42  0.42  0.42 0.82  0.82  0.82 
Central bank of India (CBI) 0.15  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.18 0.17  0.20  0.21  0.20 0.20  0.21  0.21 
Housing Dev. Fin. Corp. (HDFC)  0.47  0.48  0.48 0.39 0.40  0.40 0.58  0.59 0.58 0.50  0.51  0.51 
Ind., Credit & Inv. Corp of India (ICICI)  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 0.51  1.00  1.00 
Indian Overseas Bank (IOB)  0.23  0.24  0.24 0.21 0.22  0.21 0.26  0.26 0.26 0.25  0.26  0.25 
Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC)  0.22  0.24  0.23 0.20 0.21  0.21 0.25  0.26 0.26 0.28  0.30  0.29 
Punjab and Sind Bank (PSB) 0.26  0.28  0.27  0.25  0.26 0.26  0.25  0.26  0.25 0.20  0.21  0.21 
State Bank of India (SBI) 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00 
State Bank of Bikaner (SBB)  0.36  0.37  0.37 0.37 0.37  0.37 0.45  0.45 0.45 0.71  0.72  0.72 
State bank of Hyderabad (SBH) 0.34  0.35  0.35  0.35  0.36 0.35  0.47  0.47  0.47 0.51  0.52  0.52 
State Bank of Patiala (SBP) 0.56  0.58  0.58  1.00 1.00  1.00 0.55  0.55  0.55 0.38  0.39  0.38 
State Bank of Travancore (SBT)  0.30  0.31 0.31 0.27 0.28  0.28 0.38  0.38  0.38  0.36 0.37  0.37 
Syndicate Bank   0.19  0.20  0.20  0.16  0.17 0.16  0.18  0.19  0.19 0.17  0.18  0.18 
United Com. Bank (UCOB) 0.21  0.22  0.22  0.19  0.20 0.20  0.17  0.18  0.17 0.16  0.16  0.16 
Union Bank of India  0.22 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.25  0.26  0.26 0.24  0.24  0.24 
United Bank of India  0.21 0.22 0.22  0.18 0.19 0.19  0.19  0.19  0.19 0.15  0.15  0.15 
Source: Calculated by the authors.  16
Chinese banks becomes more pronounced when the loans have been discounted in the combined 
data to reflect presence of NPLs. However, major Indian banks such as United Bank of India and 
Union Bank of India which had received infusion of funds from the Government of India have 
either not shown any change or shown slight increase in their comparative efficiencies. Most of 
the Indian banks operating below the frontier possess low levels of efficiency, ranging mostly 
from 15 to 59 per cent. However, in contrast to some Chinese banks, none of these banks slipped 
from being fully efficient in 2002 to being inefficient in the later years (Table 4).   Four banks, 
viz. SBB, SBH, BOB and Canara Bank recorded reduced efficiency from 2002 to 2005 while the 
other banks, albeit at low levels, recorded consistent scores throughout.   Note that the relative 
efficiencies of the Indian banks do not change significantly due to adjustments for NPL (Table 
4). For some Chinese banks (ICBC, CCBC and BOC), TE fell significantly once their NPLs 
were compensated for. CMBC recorded a remarkable efficiency improvement in 2005, rising 
from about 13 per cent in the earlier years. Efficiencies of the other banks seem to remain 
somewhat low and steady of over the period (Table 4).  
In Figure 1a and 1b, we have plotted NPL adjusted PTE scores of selected banks. These are 
major banks such as CCBC, ICBC, BOC and ABC from China; and SBI and ICICI from India. 
They all confirm that the efficiencies of restructured Chinese banks have gone down 
continuously from the year 2002 to 2005. ABC has shown highest efficiency even when its loan 
output was discounted by 30 percent over the period of our study.  ABC is regarded as one with 
the maximum amount of NPLs (about 21 percent as per its annual report 2007). Chinese 
Government has just infused US$ 19 billion in ABC but it has not been restructured unlike other 
three major Chines banks. The results suggest that whereas major structured Chinese banks have 
been restrained from extending loans (output in our study), Agricultural Bank of China is still 
extending loans without any constraint and the loan amount is so high that even a reduction of 
30 percent of its loans has not altered its position in efficiency dispersion.  
The major Indian bank, SBI shows highest efficiency for every year of our study and for all the 
NPL adjusted estimates (Figure 1a and Figure 1b). Other Indian banks have not shown much 
change with the exception of BOB and Canara Bank which have recorded decline in their 
efficiencies from the year 2002 to 2005. ICICI has shown improvement in efficiency from 2002 
when loans were unadjusted and has stayed at the top with other major banks for every year of 
our study.  






Major economies in the world such as the USA and EU treat China as a non-market economy i.e. 
the economy where price at which the goods are sold is not determined by the costs incurred in   18
producing those goods because of the extensive governmental intervention in running of the 
economy (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). However, at the same time these 
countries do not apply countervailing duties against the goods coming from China on the pretext 
that they are not able to calculate the amount of subsidy extended by the Chinese government 
(Shanker, 2001).
 7  On and off, the USDOC developed different ways to deal with imports from 
China under “bubbles of capitalism test” (Meszaros, 1996), but the goods from China were 
exempted from countervailing duty actions till the end of 2007 when, the USDOC changed its 
position under the pressure of American Congress, its industries and trade unions (Jones, 2007). 
It is true that the Chinese banks provide less than 20 percent of funds raised for investment in 
China and the majority of investment in China comes from self-raised funds, the source of which 
is difficult to identify (USDOC 2007, p. 43; Allen et al, 2007).  
An important feature of the Basel I and Basel II is to improve transparency and the level playing 
field by international banks. By keeping the Capital Asset Ratio (CAR) at a comparatively low 
percentage, banks in Japan could improve their international market share significantly 
(Helleiner, 1992). If banks can extend credit either at a concessionary rate of interest or without 
insisting on the return of the credit, the practice would amount to providing a direct subsidy to 
the corporations. In China the extent of subsidy provided by the Chinese government to its 
exporting firms is difficult to estimate. However, non-returned loans or their conversion into 
shares and other banking related facilities can be easily determined.  
This study suggests that the process of generation of NPLs in China and India are quite different 
and so are their resolutions. In China, such loans have mostly been generated by the State 
Owned Enterprises and lack of a culture of market economy whereas in India such NPLs have 
been generated through businesses and sometimes priority sectors who fail to generate sufficient 
returns on their investment. The exposure of Indian banks to SOEs is quite limited. The process 
of resolution of such NPLs in India is entirely different and it is nearly impossible for market 
economies to follow the example of Chinese banking reforms.  
                                                 
7 Before the US Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit, the US Department of 
Commerce opposed the imposition of countervailing duty on the plea that since subsidy can be applied only when 
there is a market distortion and in the case of non-market economies such as that of old Czechoslovakia and China, 
there could not be any distortion of market since there was no market. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, US 
Court of International Trade, 614 F. Supp. 548 reversed by the Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit in Georgetown 
Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1317.   19
The results from the DEA analysis suggests that the Chinese restructured and recapitalized banks 
such as CCBC, BOC, and ICBC which have raised billions of dollars worth investments on the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai share market, are showing loss in their efficiencies because of greater 
oversight on these restructured banks in extending credits. Having raised investment from the 
market, these restructured banks are operating under market discipline whereas the Chinee banks 
which are still to be recapitalized and restructured are merely going ahead with the distribution 
of loans. The Indian banks have shown two trends. One is that the state owned banks such as 
State Bank of India have maintained high rate of loan advancement. The other is that private 
banks in India such as ICICI have improved dramatically in recent times.  
It is difficult to introduce a level playing field between a non-market economy such as China and 
other market economies because of an entirely different mode of financing. It is doubtful that six 
times the value of the Chinese GDP has been raised by SOEs, local bodies and private citizens 
without any accounting as self raised funds (Allen et al, 2007). This points to the difficulty in 
estimating the amount of subsidy extended to goods exported from China but permitting such 
export from China and restricting them from other market economies may amount to giving 
undue advantage to Chinese exporters. The NPLs may act as a form of direct cash subsidy in the 
export oriented economy of China but it has not attracted any countervailing duty action either 
by the USA or by the EU because of their treatment of China as a non-market economy.  
5. Conclusions 
The comparative analysis of Indian and Chinese banking sectors conducted in this study has 
resulted in some interesting observations. It is found that the major Chinese restructured banks 
such as BOC, ICBC and CCBC have been showing consistent decline in their efficiencies from 
the year 2002 to 2005. We attribute this decline in efficiency to the constraint imposed on the 
restructured Chinese banks when they have gone to the market to raise funds through the issue of 
IPOs. The Chinese bank showing maximum efficiency is ABC which so far has not transferred 
its NPLs to any AMCs and has infusion of funds from the Chinese government only in the year 
2008 (Jun, 2008). Two Indian banks, SBI and ICICI have shown consistent performance as the 
most efficient banks.  
There is the related issue that loans which are not returned or are not expected to be returned in 
the future are a type of subsidies provided to export oriented industries of China. Transparency is 
the integral part of the level playing field and unrestricted growth of NPLs can alter international   20
business scenario through extending export subsidy. The major economies in the world such as 
USA and the EU do not consider such subsidies as actionable for China whereas any minor 
infringements by other countries such as India or South Korea immediately invite punitive action. 
This practice apparently distorts the level playing field and has restricted market access for 
goods coming from open economies. An avenue for future research would be to identify the 
actual movement of non-returned bank loans in export oriented corporate houses.   21
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